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Adult age differences in errand planning: the role of task
familiarity and cognitive resources
Abstract
This study examines the effects of age, cognitive resources and task familiarity on planning
performance. 52 young and 52 old adults completed one of two errand planning tasks. The tasks were
matched for structure, difficulty and format, but differed in content, such that one planning task required
planning a real-world shopping tour whereas the other involved planning an unfamiliar space tour. In
addition, we assessed participants' memory capacity, speed of processing, inhibition, and memory for
relevant versus irrelevant task features. Results revealed no age differences for the real-world planning
material. In contrast, old adults performed worse than young adults in the artificial planning task. Data
are discussed in the context of old adults possibly being able to compensate for cognitive deficits in
speed and inhibition by selectively allocating resources to relevant task elements, but only if they
perform a planning task containing elements that approximate their real-world experience with errand
planning problems.
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This study examines the effects of age, cognitive resources and task familiarity on 
planning performance. 52 young and 52 old adults completed one of two errand planning 
tasks. The tasks were matched for structure, difficulty and format, but differed in content, 
such that one planning task required planning a real-world shopping tour whereas the other 
involved planning an unfamiliar space tour. In addition, we assessed participants' memory 
capacity, speed of processing, inhibition, and memory for relevant versus irrelevant task 
features. Results revealed no age differences for the real-world planning material. In contrast, 
old adults performed worse than young adults in the artificial planning task. Data are 
discussed in the context of old adults possibly being able to compensate for cognitive deficits 
in speed and inhibition by selectively allocating resources to relevant task elements, but only 
if they perform a planning task containing elements that approximate their real-world 
experience with errand planning problems.  
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ADULT AGE DIFFERENCES IN ERRAND PLANNING:  
THE ROLE OF TASK FAMILIARITY AND COGNITIVE RESOURCES 
The abilities to plan and to follow-up on the results of a plan (such as being able to 
plan shopping and cooking) represent key instrumental activities of daily living and are 
therefore important requirements of independence in old adults (Kliegel & Martin, 2003).  
The relevance of planning has been demonstrated for a number of patient populations in 
which impairments in the ability to organize ones own activities, e.g., in dementia, typically 
result in the need for external care (e.g., Royall, 1994). Moreover, also in normal healthy 
aging, it has been shown that less efficient errand planning affects delayed execution of the 
plan and results in pronounced forgetting of those errands (Kliegel, McDaniel & Einstein, 
2000).  
Therefore, the cognitive skills involved in planning have been attracting the attention 
of a growing number of cognitive and developmental psychologists in the last decade (see 
Morris & Ward, 2005, for an overview, and Phillips, MacLeod & Kliegel, 2005, for a review 
of adult age effects on planning).  However, results of previous studies that study planning as 
one type of problem solving with respect to age-related effects in planning performance have 
revealed inconsistent data (see Phillips et al., 2005; Thonton & Dumke, 2005).  While some 
studies report age-related declines in planning performance in problem-solving task such as 
the Tower of London or the Six Elements Task (e.g., Kliegel et al., 2000; Lachman & Burack, 
1993), others point to a comparable level of planning performance in young and old adults in 
tests such as the Multiple Errands Task (e.g., Garden, Phillips, & MacPherson, 2001; Poon et 
al., 1992; Smith & Baltes, 1990).  
Considering the processes involved in a planning task such as a traditional errand 
problem task (e.g., Hayes-Roth & Hayes-Roth, 1979), one line of reasoning would predict 
lower planning performance in old compared to young adults.  There are several cognitive 
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processes that have been suggested to affect performance in planning tasks (see, e.g., Allaire 
& Marsiske, 1999; Phillips et al., 2005):  (A) In a planning task, one has to recall plenty of 
information.  Hence, memory capacity possibly contributes to the prediction of planning 
performance.  (B) In most planning tasks, the available planning time is limited.  Therefore, 
speed of processing may influence planning performance.  (C) To plan effectively often 
means to “step back” and carefully consider the provided information rather than to act 
spontaneously.  Hence, the ability to inhibit the over-learned reactions or misleading 
responses to a problem as well as the interference of irrelevant information may play an 
important part in planning performance.  These cognitive processes typically show age-related 
deficits (see, e.g., Craik & Salthouse, 2000) and, therefore, should produce age-related deficits 
in planning performance (as it is suggested by Thornton & Dumke’s, 2005, recent review on 
age effects in everyday problem solving which may be applied to the problem of errand 
planning, as typical errand planning tasks represent a type of problem that occurs in everyday 
life, and generating plans involves weighing up and choosing between alternative 
routes/orders or errands).  
Other considerations, however, might suggest comparable performances of old and 
young adults in planning tasks.  Generally, deficits in some cognitive processing domains do 
not necessarily predict an overall cognitive deficit.  For example, Salthouse (1984) reported 
that despite some cognitive deficits, old typists showed typing performance comparable to 
young adults as they were able to compensate for declining psychomotor speed by being able 
to further looking ahead in the material to be typed.   
More generally, across the lifespan, older adults acquire considerable experience in 
planning, for example in scheduling several errands during the course of the day (as Martin & 
Ewert, 1997, have shown in a real-world planning task requiring participants to plan a holiday 
trip). Therefore planning performance may be relatively preserved in old age despite possible 
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declines in some cognitive processes related to planning performance (e.g., Garden et al., 
2001).  Accordingly, a recent meta-analysis of prospective memory tasks, which require the 
planning and execution of an intention to carry out a task (Henry, MacLeod, Phillips & 
Crawford, 2004) indicates a substantial age-related deficit in plan execution on laboratory 
tasks, but an age-related benefit of the same magnitude in plan execution in naturalistic tasks.  
Thus, it seems possible that age-related planning performance can be explained by differences 
in (cognitive) processes required for the planning tasks, depending on the familiarity of the 
elements of the task to be planned (see, e.g., Collins, Luszcz, Lawson & Keeves, 1997; 
Denney, 1990; Diehl, Willis & Schaie, 1995; Patrick & Strough, 2004; Willis, 1996 for 
similar considerations of the importance of task familiarity and relevance in the everyday 
problem-solving literature).   
Most recently, Phillips, Kliegel and Martin (in press) have reported initial 
experimental evidence for this proposal using two established neuropsychological 
computerized planning procedures.  In their study, age-related performance in the Tower of 
London planning task (TOL; Shallice, 1982) was compared with performance in the Plan-a-
day task (PAD; Funke & Krüger, 1993; Kohler, Poser, & Schönle, 1995), a task which is used 
to investigate more contextualized planning and which is based upon classical "daily errands" 
tasks (e.g., Berg, Johnson, Meegan & Strough, 2003; Hayes-Roth & Hayes-Roth, 1979; 
Margrett & Marsiske, 2002).  While there were reliable age differences in the laboratory-
based TOL, which could mostly be explained by age differences in processing speed, there 
were no significant age differences in the PAD, which was mostly related to participants’ 
educational level.  Phillips et al. (in press) concluded that these data might indicate that on 
planning tasks that deal with contextualized materials, old adults may be able to compensate 
for age-related declines in processing speed through utilization of relevant knowledge. 
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However, this issue has not been previously addressed by directly manipulating the 
familiarity of task features in one planning procedure.  Guided by the considerations 
developed above and particularly resting on the hypothesis that in real-world situations old 
adults may be able to compensate for age-related declines in processing resources through 
utilization of relevant knowledge acquired through task-related experience, we implemented 
the following experimental strategy to address this issue.  First, we tested age-related 
performance in an errand planning task manipulating its surface structure in order to comprise 
task elements that approximate participants’ real-world errand planning experience or contain 
novel, unfamiliar material.  Second, the cognitive mechanisms that might underlie age 
differences in planning performance were assessed, i.e., general memory capacity, speed of 
processing, inhibition, and memory for relevant versus irrelevant task features.  The latter was 
chosen because, using a shopping list task, Ewert and Martin (1993; see also Martin & Ewert, 
1997) have shown that focusing on relevant information and ignoring irrelevant information is 
an important process in planning.  Moreover, they speculated that older adults may be able 
optimize their planning performance by selecting task-relevant information.  Thus, we aimed 
to explore if the efficiency of this process in- or decreases in old age and if it reflects a 
possible way of optimizing ones planning performance. 
We evaluated several predictions. (1) We anticipated a significant interaction between 
age group and planning task type, with an advantage for young adults (relative to old adults) 
on the unfamiliar planning task, but no age differences on the real-world planning task. (2) 
Further, we predicted that the age differences for the unfamiliar planning task would be 
reduced by covarying measures of memory, speed or inhibition. (3) For the real-world 
planning task, we explored the role of focusing on task-relevant information as a process 




Participants and design   
In this study, 52 young (M = 25.6; SD = 5.3; range: 19-40) and 52 old (M = 70.9; SD = 
6.2; range: 60-84) adults took part.  There were no significant cohort or condition differences 
concerning gender (younger adults: 18 female; older adults: 19 female) and level of education 
(younger adults: M = 14.2 years of formal education; SD = 1.6; older adults: M = 13.7; SD = 
2.4).  All participants were Caucasian. The young adults were undergraduate students.  The 
old participants were community dwelling adults who volunteered for the present experiment. 
The study had a 2 (age: young versus old adults) x 2 (planning task features: real-world versus 
artificial) between subjects design. Twenty-six participants of each age group were allocated 
to one of the two planning conditions. 
 
Measures and procedure   
Planning. At first, we applied a planning measure derived from the errand planning 
task introduced by Bisiacchi and colleagues (see Bisiacchi, 1996; Bisiacchi et al., 1998, for 
more details).  In general, participants’ task is to plan a sequence of six errands.  Parts of the 
material are presented in the Appendices A and B.   
(a) Version A (real-world). For this task version, following Bisiacchi et al., 
participants were presented with a town map of the area in which they were to run the six 
errands, which included paying an electricity bill, withdrawing money from the bank to pay 
the bill, visiting a friend in the hospital, getting holiday pictures to show the friend in the 
hospital, buying a birthday present for a nephew, and getting medicine for oneself.  They were 
asked to produce a plan for completing as many of the six errands as possible, using the 
shortest possible route.  The participants’ task here is to sequence errands, to time actions, and 
to logically order goals (e.g., they must recognize that they first need to go to the bank in 
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order to withdraw the money that they will need to pay a bill, which follows in another step).  
Moreover, they were given some constraints concerning the setting in the task: the time of 
starting and when they had to be back at home, opening hours of some shops or offices, and 
distances (in minutes) between several places.  In addition, the map, the distance information, 
and the instruction contained more information than needed - i.e., irrelevant places or, for 
example, the reason why the friend is in the hospital.  After the task was explained, 
participants had 10 minutes to prepare their plan.  They had to write down their plan in list 
form on a prepared answer-sheet. The quality of the plan was scored in accordance to 
Bisiacchi’s original scoring scheme (1996) considering besides the number of planned errands 
also the avoidance of errors (such as paying the bill before having withdrawn the money or 
disregarding opening hours; see also Bisiacchi et al., 1998, for more details).  
(b) Version B (artificial). Here, participants had to work on an errand planning task 
that was parallel to version A, but transferred the setting as well as the errands and task 
constraints into an unfamiliar, novel setting.  Structurally, however, it was isomorphic to 
version A. In fact, all instructions of the planning task were analogous to version A.  Only the 
surface features were modified to fit the unfamiliar setting:  Participants’ task was to plan a 
sequence of six errands.  However, in this experiment the errands to be planned included 
paying your taxes at planet A (version A: paying an electricity bill), withdrawing gold from 
planet B to pay the taxes (version A: withdrawing money from the bank to pay the bill), 
visiting a politician at planet C (version A: visiting a friend in the hospital), getting documents 
to show the politician (version A: getting holiday pictures to show the friend in the hospital), 
buying a birthday present for the 200th birthday of a nephew (version A: buying a birthday 
present for a nephew), and getting medicine-plants for oneself (version A: getting medicine 
for oneself).  Again, participants were presented with a map of the scene (here: an outer space 
section) and information regarding the task constraints.  Participants were asked to produce a 
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plan for completing as many of the six errands as possible, using the shortest (possible) route.  
Again, the map, the distance information and the instruction contained more information than 
needed - i.e., places irrelevant for the task at hand or, for example, the reason why the 
politician is at the specific planet (version A: why the friend is in the hospital).  After 
explaining the task, participants had 10 minutes to prepare their plan.  They had to write down 
their plan on the same prepared answer-sheet as in version A.  Parts of the material are 
presented in the Appendix B. 
Memory for relevant versus irrelevant task features. Next, we assessed memory for 
relevant versus irrelevant features of the planning task.  The object of interest here is the 
allocation of resources to relevant and to ignore irrelevant information and we closely 
followed the previously developed procedure used by Martin and Ewert (1997).  After having 
finished the planning task, participants were asked 10 questions by the experimenter about 
relevant information of the planning task (e.g., both versions: What did you have to buy for 
your nephew?) and 10 questions about irrelevant information (e.g., version A: Where on the 
map is the school?; version B: Where on the map is the planet P?).  Relevant information is 
defined as information that is needed to perform the planning task.  Both types of information 
were visible during the entire planning task, but not during the time participants had to answer 
these 20 questions.  Before and during the planning task, the participants were not told that 
there would be questions about the planning task.  The number of correct answers to 
irrelevant questions was subtracted from the number of correct answers to relevant questions.  
The relation between correct recalled irrelevant and relevant information has been proven to 
be a reliable indicator of the allocation of resources to task-relevant elements in errand 
planning tasks (Ewert & Martin, 1993; Martin & Ewert, 1997).  
Cognitive variables.  In a second part of the session, several cognitive measures were 
administered: memory capacity, speed of processing, and inhibition.  The study material for 
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the memory test was action phrases (“to drive a car”; cf. Engelkamp, 1991).  There were 16 
actions to learn and each action was presented on a card for 5 seconds.  The delay between 
study and test was approximately 4 minutes.  At test, participants had 2 minutes to recall the 
action phrases.  Free recall was scored by the number of actions correctly recalled.  The delay 
was filled with the color word Stroop test, described next. 
A traditional color-word version of the Stroop-task (cf. Stroop, 1935; for applications 
cf. Houx, Jolles, & Vreeling, 1993) was used to measure inhibition (e.g., Spieler, Balota, & 
Faust, 1996).  In this task, the word stimuli consisted of four color names (red, blue, green, 
and yellow) written in black ink (trial 1 consisted of reading the words as fast as possible), 
color bars printed in red, blue, green, and yellow (trial 2 consisted of naming the colors as fast 
as possible), and the four color names printed in mismatching colors (trial 3 consisted of 
naming the colors of the words as fast as possible).  Each Stroop condition began with 
practice of the top line consisting of five items followed by timed performance on the 20 test 
items (consisting of five rows of four items each).  The score derived was the relative increase 
in time to name the color of the ink of the colored words in relation to naming the color of 
color bars.  
The digit-symbol subtask of the Wechsler-Adult-Intelligence-Scale was administered 
as the measure of speed of processing (revised version; Wechsler, 1981).  After the 
introduction and an practice phase of 7 items, the participants started and were stopped after 
90 seconds by the experimenter.  Speed was assessed by the number of correct symbols.   
 
Results 
We first conducted a 2x2 between subjects ANOVA on planning performance with 
age (young versus old adults) and planning task version (real-world versus artificial material) 
as factors (see Table 2, first row).  After testing for age differences in cognitive resources 
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(Table 1), we then investigated the influence of potential underlying cognitive mechanisms by 
conducting separate analyses of covariance (ANCOVA) for each of the following covariates: 
memory capacity, speed of processing, inhibition, and memory for relevant versus irrelevant 
task features (see Table 2, rows 2 – 5; see Kliegel, Phillips, Lemke, & Kopp, 2005, for a 
similar analytical approach). 
Effects of age and task version on planning performance. The ANOVA revealed a 
significant main effect of age group on planning performance indicating that the young adults 
showed better planning performance than the old adults (Myoung = 7.75, SD = 1.70 versus Mold 
= 6.46, SD = 1.82; for the F-values and effect sizes see Table 2). This age effect was qualified 
by a significant age x task version interaction, indicating that this age effect only emerged in 
the artificial task version (Myoung = 8.51, SD = 1.55 versus Mold = 5.90, SD = 1.68; t(50) = 
5.83, p < .01). In the real-world task condition, there was no significant age effect (Myoung = 
6.98, SD = 1.51 versus Mold = 7.02, SD = 1.82; t(50) = -.08, n.s.). The main effect of task 
version was not significant.  
Age differences in cognitive variables.  Before covarying cognitive resources, single-
factor analyses of variance (ANOVAs) were performed to determine if there were reliable 
differences between young and old adults on the individual difference measures of memory 
capacity, speed of processing, and inhibition. As summarized in Table 1, there were robust 
age differences in all three cognitive variables, indicating better performance in young adults.  
Because memory for relevant versus irrelevant task features was assessed in the specific 
context of each planning task version, this measure was analysed using a 2(age) x 2(task 
version) between-subjects ANOVA. There were no significant main effects of age or task 
version on memory for relevant versus irrelevant task features, both F’s < 1.  More 
importantly, a significant interaction indicated that in the more familiar task, old adults did 
better than young adults in remembering relevant questions in relation to irrelevant questions 
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(Mold = 5.44, SD = 2.04 versus Myoung = 3.25, SD = 1.34) while in the less familiar planning 
task, young adults were better than old adults (Myoung = 5.21, SD = 1.72 versus Mold = 3.37, SD 
= 1.54), F(1,103) = 37.71, p < .01.  
Covarying cognitive resources. The ANCOVAs1 revealed that covarying memory 
capacity did not change the results significantly (see Table 2, second row). However, when 
covarying speed of processing (Table 2, third row) and when covarying inhibition (Table 2, 
forth row), the main effect of age group disappeared. In contrast, in both ANCOVAs, the age 
x task version interaction remained significant. Finally, when covarying memory for relevant 
versus irrelevant task features, the opposite picture emerged. Here, the main effect of age 
remained but the age x task version interaction was no longer significant. 
Discussion 
The existing literature on age effects on planning performance reveals an inconsistent 
pattern.  While some studies report age-related declines in planning tasks, others point to a 
comparable level of planning performance in both young and old adults (Phillips et al., 2005).  
We hypothesized that these results might reflect the fact that though planning is generally a 
very resource demanding task, under certain familiar circumstances, old adults might be able 
to perform near the level of young adults (as it is discussed in the everyday problems solving 
literature; Willis, 1996; Thornton & Dumke, 2005). Directly testing this assumption in the 
present study, several interesting and somewhat novel findings emerged. 
A central finding of the present study is that age differences in the planning task only 
emerged in the version containing unfamiliar, artificial task elements. With an isomorphic 
task version that contained real-world task elements, significant age effects in planning 
performance did not emerge. This is line with previous work, e.g., by Garden et al. (2001) and 
Phillips et al. (in press) who also report differential age-related deficits in planning tasks but 
the current paper extends those results by keeping the structure, format, and difficulty of 
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familiar and unfamiliar planning tasks identical, while only varying the novelty of content. 
This finding suggests that in the more familiar planning task old adults may have been able to 
compensate for their cognitive deficits; but no such compensation might have occurred in the 
planning task containing artificial task elements.  We will elaborate on this issue below. 
A second relevant finding concerns the role of cognitive resources in age-related 
planning performance. Memory capacity did not seem to be an important factor of influence 
in the present errand planning task. This appears to be plausible as the planning task material 
was always present during task performance and had not to be memorized in order to perform 
the task.  In contrast, speed of processing and inhibition were revealed to be associated to the 
obtained age effect in planning. This is in line with previous findings on the effect of speed of 
processing (e.g., Salthouse, 1993) and inhibition (e.g., Zacks & Hasher, 1994) on age-related 
cognitive performance in general, indicating that not age per se but age-related decrements of 
basic cognitive processing resources such as speed and inhibition are related to age deficits in 
more complex cognitive tasks.  
The third important finding is that the interaction between age and task version was 
only eliminated by memory for relevant versus irrelevant task features - note that general 
memory capacity did not have this effect.  Thus, although this does not reveal a direct causal 
link between memory for relevant task features and age-related planning performance, the 
interaction between age and task familiarity could be related to old adults being better in 
memorizing relevant task aspects and to inhibiting irrelevant task information in the familiar 
task only.  Considering that young people showed both better selective retention and better 
planning than old participants in the artificial task version, one might argue that young adults 
might have more experience with rather artificial science-fiction-like space environments. 
However, even then, the hypothesis that familiarity favors planning performance still seems to 
be a plausible explanation. One could additionally argue that, besides in familiarity, the two 
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tasks also differed in the formality of the relationships (e.g., items involving a friend versus a 
politician).2 The latter factor may be a separate influence upon performance, but should 
presumably act in the same direction. Future work on the tasks applied will have to directly 
examine these issues. Another potential limitation might be that older adults might have 
worked on the artificial planning task with less motivation than on the real-world planning 
task. Post-hoc interviews as well as pilot data with both versions clearly indicated that is at 
least very unlikely as in both task versions participants were asked “to solve a tricky problem” 
and were eagerly trying to do so.  Finally, one might argue that the measure of memory for 
relevant versus irrelevant information is heavily dependent on overall memory ability. 
However, previous work (Ewert & Martin, 1993; Martin & Ewert, 1997) has repeatedly 
demonstrated this measure to be an effective tool to assess inhibitory efficiency in planning 
task. Moreover, as indicated, overall memory capacity did not substantially influence any 
effect revealed by the initial ANOVA, especially not the age x familiarity interaction, unlike 
the irrelevant / relevant memory scores. Finally and importantly, a close post-hoc inspection 
of the individual data for memory of relevant and irrelevant information showed that there 
was no individual who obtained a low discrimination score through having almost perfect 
recall for both relevant and irrelevant with the maximum recall for irrelevant information 
being 5 out of 10. In sum, these observations are in line with the conclusion that this measure 
is at least related to a person’s selective resource allocation for relevant versus irrelevant task 
information. Nevertheless, more direct ways of assessing selective resource allocation to 
relevant task information (e.g., through measuring inspection times for distinct information 
aspects) are clearly needed in future studies to confirm the present finding. 
Taken together, these results have several implications.  Most importantly, the results 
can be interpreted to indicate a compensatory process in cognitive development in late life 
and suggest at least parts of its underlying mechanisms.  Thus, data are in line with models of 
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successful cognitive aging which underscore the effectiveness of compensatory processes in 
the elderly (e.g., Baltes & Baltes, 1990).  In line with these models, in the present study, 
selection of relevant information appeared as a potential compensatory process that emerged 
when old adults were faced with real-world cognitive materials.  Further studies will have to 
confirm that it is truly older adults’ level of experience with real-world planning scenarios 
(e.g., by directly assessing individual differences in the level of experience) that is underlying 
this effect.  Considering the structure of the memory for relevant versus irrelevant task 
features measure, however, the data seem to reveal an example of how old adults might 
selectively compensate.  Again, it remains to be directly tested if individuals actually 
perceived the irrelevant task information as being irrelevant. Nevertheless, the present study 
clearly demonstrates that confronted with a complex but rather familiar task structure, old 
adults appeared to be able to utilize those parts of information that are essential for solving the 
real-world planning task.   
With respect to the label compensation, one could argue that the present data do not 
indicate that old adults consciously applied information selection as a deliberate strategy to 
compensate for their cognitive deficits and, therefore, the observed results do not reflect 
compensational processes.  However, both Dixon and Bäckman's (1995) and Salthouse's 
(1995) concepts of compensation agree on the fundamental issue that compensation does not 
necessarily require that the individual is aware of the deficit and takes deliberate action to 
compensate.  Rather, Bäckman and Dixon (1992) state that "compensation can be inferred 
when an objective or perceived mismatch between accessible skills and environmental 
demands is counterbalanced (either automatically or deliberately)" (p. 272).  A more direct 
test of these conclusions, of course, would be an intraindividual, within-subjects design, 
explicitly manipulating the application of potential counterbalancing mechanisms in reaction 
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to a mismatch.  However, the present data are at least consistent with the suggested 
conclusions and, therefore, may serve as an impetus for future research in this direction. 
Finally, with respect to the everyday problem solving literature, data indicate that on a 
cognitively challenging everyday problem older adults may perform just as well as younger 
adults. On a first view this result seems to be in contrast with Thornton and Dumke’s (2005) 
meta-analysis on everyday problem solving that reveals that older adults on average perform 
more poorly than younger adults. However, Thornton and Dumke (2005) also acknowledge 
that on the level of specific tasks “findings regarding the effectiveness of everyday problem 
solving in aging are highly discrepant” (p. 85). Moreover, one of the two major theoretical 
approaches regarding how age may impact everyday problem-solving explicitly emphasizes 
the importance of experience and accumulated knowledge structures in maintaining adult 
cognition (Marsiske & Willis, 1995). In consequence, for example, Baltes (1993) argues that 
to the extent that the problems faced are routine everyday problem solving may be preserved 
with age. Summarizing the considerations discussed above, the present study might just 
represent an example of such a real-world problem, additionally revealing a potential process 
(i.e., information selection) associated with the observed age invariance. 
 




 Utilizing multiple regression analyses revealed the same results. 
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Cognitive Individual Difference Variables  
 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Variable   Young Adults   Old Adults    F- 
    M (SD)   M (SD)  Value 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Memory Capacity  7.12  (2.48)   4.29  (2.25)  37.05** 
Speed of Processing  64.42  (9.37)   48.54  (9.73)  71.95** 
Inhibition   9.02  (6.33)   21.17  (9.97)  54.98** 
___________________________________________________________________________ 




Effects of Age Group, Planning Task Version (real-world versus artificial) and Cognitive Resources on Planning Performance 
 
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
  Effect of     Age    Task Version   Age x Task Version Interaction 
     
 F-Value η2  F-Value η2  F-Value η2 
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Original ANOVA   15.84** .14  0.41  .01  16.80** .14 
 
Effect when covarying … 
 Memory Capacity   5.41*  .05  0.41  .01  11.13** .10 
 Processing Speed   2.50  .03  1.75  .02  16.25** .14 
 Inhibition    1.35  .01  3.31  .03  22.28** .18 
 Relevant vs. Irrelevant Information 19.89** .17  0.57  .01  2.81  .03 
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
*p < .05, **p < .01 
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Appendix A 
Planning Instructions in Version A (real-world) 
 
Imagine that you live in city X, it is Thursday, and you have to do several errands. You will 
begin at 9 am (ready to go out from your place). You have to be back home at 11.30 am, 
because your brother will bring you a new table. While outside you have to try to do all the 
following errands. 
 
1. Pay your electricity-bill at the office of the electricity company ELEC (open from 8 
am to 9.30 am) or at the post office (open from 8 am to 1 am). 
2. Go to the bank (National Bank) to withdraw money to pay the electricity-bill (open 
from 9 am to 11 am - you have enough money for the other errands). 
3. Go to pay a visit to your friend who is in the hospital because of a sports-injury 
(visiting hours from 10 am to noon). 
4. Go to pick up some photographs of your last trip to Paris that you want to bring your 
friend who is in the hospital. 
5. Go to the pharmacy to buy some medicine for yourself. 
6. Buy a present for your nephew’s 12th birthday. 
 
You have to use the city-map and the scheme of distances between different places. You are 
required to plan your morning so as to be able to do as many errands as possible in the most 
efficient way. Allow a 10 min delay-time for visit in the hospital, a 8 min delay-time for 
buying the present and a 3 min delay-time for the other places.  




Planning Instructions in Version B (artificial) 
 
Imagine that you live in the sector X of the universe in the year 4035, and you have to do 
several errands with your space ship. You will begin at (space time) 9 am (ready to go out 
from your home base). You have to be back home at (space time) 11.30 am, because your 
brother will bring you a new space cruiser. While outside you have to try to do all the 
following errands. 
 
1. Pay your taxes at the the planet Ostra III (spaceport open from – space time – 8 am to 
9.30 am) or at the planet Zetra (spaceport open from – space time – 8 am to 1 am). 
2. Go to the gold depot (in sector XA) to withdraw gold to pay the taxes (spaceport open 
from – space time – 9 am to 11 am - you have enough gold for the other errands). 
3. Go to pay a visit to the chancellor of the planet Delta who is waiting their for you to 
sign a contract (visiting hours from – space time – 10 am to noon). 
4. Go to pick up some documents concerning the recent mining project that you want to 
take to the chancellor. 
5. Go to the Planet Zyklon to buy some medicine plants for yourself. 
6. Buy a present for your nephew’s 200th birthday at the planet Ban. 
 
You have to use the space-map and the scheme of distances between different planets. You 
are required to plan your morning so to be able to do as many errands as possible in the most 
efficient way. Allow a 10 min delay-time for visit with the chancellor, a 8 min delay-time for 
buying the present and a 3 min delay-time for the other places.  
Write your plan on the answer sheet. You have 10 min time to plan this trip. 
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